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Chapter 2
The Misperception of Risk
The moment we want to believe something, we suddenly see all the 
arguments for it, and become blind to the arguments against it.
—George Bernard Shaw
One hundred years ago, the “unsinkable” Titanic foundered after striking an iceberg 
off the coast of Newfoundland. More than 1,500 people died in what became one of the 
deadliest maritime accidents ever. Several factors contributed to this massive death toll, 
but perhaps the most critical was that there simply weren’t enough lifeboats. The ship 
carried 2,224 people, but fewer than half of them could squeeze into the boats.
As we know, passengers who didn’t get a spot in one of those lifeboats quickly died 
in the freezing waters of the North Atlantic. What’s less well known is that the Titanic’s 
supply of lifeboats was in full compliance with the British marine regulations in force at 
time. The law required the ship to carry 16 lifeboats; the Titanic actually had 20 lifeboats.
The ship’s owners did a good job of providing enough boats to address the regulatory 
risk of noncompliance. Unfortunately, meeting regulatory requirements did little to 
prevent the tragic loss of life.
This is a case of misperception of risk. The owners focused on mitigating the 
regulatory risk, apparently blind to the much larger risk of disaster. A sad footnote: reports 
suggest the Titanic had enough capacity to easily add enough lifeboats for everyone on 
board, had the owners chosen to do so.
What does this example have to do with information security? We encounter 
misperceptions every day within the realm of enterprise risk and security. Furthermore, 
unless we mitigate these misperceptions, they can have disastrous consequences. As 
a result, I believe the misperception of risk is the most significant vulnerability facing 
enterprises today.
The Subjectivity of Risk Perception
As security professionals, we tend to think about objective ways to estimate risk—to 
assess the likelihood and extent of harm that can occur due to specific threats and 
vulnerabilities.
But in reality, the way people perceive risk has a strong subjective component. 
Economic and psychological factors greatly affect how each of us perceives the likelihood 
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and potential impact of harm from specific actions or situations. Within an organization, 
each individual’s perception of risk varies depending on his or her job role, goals, 
background, and peer group. This means managers, security professionals, and end users 
all may have a different view of the risk associated with a specific technology or action.
Misperceiving risk has serious consequences because our actions are shaped 
by our perception of risk. An employee may think posting personal and work-related 
information on a social-media site is relatively harmless. However, hackers might use this 
publicly available information in phishing e-mails to gain access to enterprise systems via 
the employee’s computer, ultimately resulting in detrimental security breaches.
End users are not the only members of the organization who can misperceive risk. 
Everyone is capable of misperceiving risk, including risk and security professionals. As 
I’ll explain later in this chapter, misperceptions occur at the group level as well as the 
individual level. Members of a group may share the same bias in their perception of risk 
and benefit.
The decisions that result from these misperceptions can weaken the entire 
organization’s security posture. If an organization underestimates a risk, it will under 
spend on controls to mitigate that risk, increasing the likelihood and potential impact 
of major problems such as data breaches. On the other hand, if the organization 
overestimates a risk, it will allocate a disproportionately large share of its security 
resources to the risk, leaving other parts of the risk landscape underprotected.
In this chapter, I’ll discuss how and why different people within an organization 
misperceive risk—whether they are acting as information technology users, security 
professionals, or managerial decision makers. To explore these misperceptions, 
I’ve drawn on research across the broader field of risk psychology, notably The 
Psychology of Risk, a book by Professor Dame Glynis Breakwell, Vice Chancellor of 
the University of Bath (Cambridge University Press, 2007). I’ll examine how these 
ideas about risk perception apply to information risk and security. I’ll explain some 
of the consequences of those misperceptions, and I’ll discuss some of the ways an 
organization can address them.
How Employees Misperceive Risk
Research shows that if we like an activity, we tend to judge its benefits to be high and its 
risk to be low (Slovic 2010). Conversely, if we dislike the activity, we judge it as low-benefit 
and high-risk. Because of this, the perception of risk by individuals and groups within an 
organization tends to be biased by their preferences, roles, and objectives. Everyone is 
trying to achieve their individual or group goals within the organization, so they tend to 
see activities and technologies that support those goals as beneficial, and therefore they 
tend to underestimate the risk.
So if employees like social media, their attraction to the technology skews their 
perception of benefit and risk. Because they judge the benefit to be high and the risk to be 
low, they feel comfortable posting information such as their job title, location, and even 
the projects they’re working on. They may even allow sites to capture their location, using 
the global positioning system in their cell phone, and display the location in real time.
Unfortunately, these employees may not think about how a malicious individual 
could use the information. Today, as we’ve seen, an individual’s use of technology can 
harm not only the individual, but the entire organization. Attackers exploit publicly 
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available personal information to craft spearphishing e-mails that are particularly 
convincing because they appear to demonstrate a relationship with the recipient, making 
the employee more likely to click on a link that downloads malware to the system. From 
there, the attack spreads to the rest of the corporate network. In addition, information 
posted by individuals is now routinely aggregated, analyzed to identify patterns, and sold, 
often to a company’s competitors.
The risk and security team may also misperceive the risk of social media, but in the 
opposite direction—they overestimate the risk and underestimate the benefits. They may 
not like social media because it creates vulnerabilities, and their perception then drives 
them to focus on minimizing the risk by trying to block the use of the technology.
Other psychological factors also come into play in shaping end users’ risk 
perception. People in general tend to believe they are personally less likely than others 
to experience negative events, and more likely to experience positive events, leading to 
a sense of personal invulnerability (Breakwell 2007). In addition, users also are more 
likely to behave in risky ways if their colleagues do so. “It’s conformity—being seen to be 
doing what everybody else is doing,” Breakwell says (pers. comm.). Many social media 
sites encourage this conformist tendency—if all your friends are using a social media 
site, you’re likely to join the site too because it enables you to see what they are doing and 
share information with them more easily.
The likelihood that individuals will behave in ways risky to the organization also 
increases when their individual interests don’t align with the company’s. This divergence 
is most likely when employees are discontented, resentful, demoralized, or simply don’t 
trust IT or the broader organization.
In economic theory, the problem resulting from this lack of alignment is known as a 
moral hazard: a situation in which someone behaves differently from the way they would 
if they were fully exposed to the risk. A useful moral hazard analogy is renting a car with 
full insurance coverage. People are likely to be less careful with the rental car than they 
would be with their own car if they’re not responsible for the consequences. The attitude 
is “if it’s not mine, it doesn’t matter.”
In the realm of enterprise IT, moral hazards may be a bigger concern than many 
appreciate. A Cisco survey (2011a) found that 61 percent of employees felt they were not 
responsible for protecting information and devices, believing instead that their IT groups 
or IT service providers were accountable. Ominously, 70 percent of these surveyed 
employees said they frequently ignored IT policies.
One indicator of the extent of moral hazard within an organization may be how 
employees treat company-provided laptops. Higher-than-average loss or damage rates 
might suggest employees don’t care about the laptops and may be an indication they 
don’t care about other corporate assets either. As I’ll discuss in Chapter 5, I believe 
allowing reasonable personal use of laptops can help reduce the risk of moral hazard 
because it aligns personal interests with those of the organization.
More broadly, organizations can address the moral hazard issue by taking steps 
to align the goals and concerns of everyone involved: end users, information security 
professionals, and executives. This returns to the theme of the book—as information 
security professionals, our mission is to Protect to Enable. This mission aligns our security 
goals with those of the business. It helps maintain the perception of shared values. 
Research suggests that people with whom we share values are deemed more trustworthy 
(Breakwell 2007, 143). If employees trust us, they are more likely to believe our warnings 
and act on our recommendations.
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One further point to remember is that everyone in the organization, regardless of 
the job role, is an end user. Therefore, we can all fall prey to the same tendencies. For 
example, we may be attracted to new consumer technologies and tend to ignore the risks.
How Security Professionals Misperceive Risk
While end users tend to underestimate the risks of a desirable activity or technology, 
security professionals sometimes display the opposite tendency. We focus obsessively 
on the information risk associated with a specific threat or vulnerability. In doing so, we 
completely miss bigger risks.
This phenomenon is known as target fixation—a term originally coined to describe 
a situation in which fighter-bomber pilots focus so intently on a target during a strafing 
or bombing run that they fail to notice the bigger risk to themselves and crash into the 
target as a result (Colgan 2010, 44). As information security professionals, we can develop 
a similar fixation. We focus so intently on one risk that our awareness of larger hazards is 
diminished. This target fixation can also occur in other groups with “control” functions 
within the organization, such as internal audit, legal compliance, and corporate risk 
management.
Here is an example from our own experience at Intel, which I’ll discuss further in 
Chapter 9. Several years ago, we discovered that malware had been introduced onto our 
network from an employee’s personal computer. We became so focused on this source 
of danger that we eliminated all personal devices from our network. We further fueled 
our target fixation by labeling these devices non-Intel managed systems (NIMS), a term 
that reflected the frustration over our lack of control. I vowed we would never again allow 
network access from devices that we didn’t fully control.
However, by becoming fixated on a single threat, we may have created some larger 
risks and additional costs. For example, we needed to issue contract employees with 
corporate PCs, each of which allowed broader access to the Intel environment. If we 
had instead focused on how we could provide limited access to the environment from 
“untrusted” devices, we might have managed the risk with lower total cost and obtained 
a head start in developing a key aspect of our current security strategy, as I’ll describe in 
Chapter 8.
As security professionals, we also may misperceive risk due to the tendency to “set 
and forget” security controls. This common security loophole is described in the sixth 
Irrefutable Law of Information Security in Chapter 1, which states that the efficacy of a 
control deteriorates with time. Once in place, controls tend to remain static, while the 
threats they are intended to mitigate continue to evolve and change, sometimes in very 
dynamic ways. Controls that are initially very effective can become inadequate over time. 
Ultimately, an adverse event may occur and may even have disastrous consequences.
Think about the history of major oil tanker spills. For years, regulations allowed 
tankers to be built with a single hull, instead of a double (inner and outer) hull to provide 
additional protection in the event of a leak. Meanwhile, tankers grew steadily larger 
because bigger ships could transport oil more efficiently than smaller ones. It wasn’t 
until the Exxon Valdez ran aground, puncturing its hull and creating a giant oil leak that 
contaminated huge stretches of Alaska’s coast, that authorities were spurred to create new 
regulations requiring double hulls in oil tankers (EPA 2011).
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Within enterprise IT, a typical “set and forget” error is the failure to keep controls 
up-to-date, particularly if the controls are designed to mitigate a relatively low risk. A 
case in point: distributed denial of service (DDoS) threats were a big concern more than 
a decade ago, due to widely publicized attacks by worms such as Code Red, Nimda, and 
SQL Slammer. These attacks disabled corporate web sites or flooded internal networks 
by overloading them with requests. To mitigate the availability risk, many organizations 
invested in defenses against DDoS attacks.
Over time, however, DDoS attacks became less frequent, and organizations were 
assailed by newer threats. With limited resources, information security groups focused 
on mitigating these new threats rather than continuing to build defenses against DDoS 
attacks. At the same time, though, businesses were increasing their online presence. Web 
sites evolved from being used primarily for advertising and displaying static corporate 
information to managing business-critical data and applications. Some organizations 
began conducting all their business online. Even traditional brick-and-mortar businesses 
moved customer support, order management, and other critical business processes 
onto the Web. The larger online presence multiplied the potential impact of a successful 
attack. As a result, when DDoS attacks from a variety of groups resurfaced in the past few 
years, they created even greater disruption to business operations as well as damage to 
corporate brands.
Another example: over the past few years, many organizations have become much  
more diligent about scrubbing data from the hard drives of old computers before disposing 
of them or reselling them. But they failed to follow similar precautions for other business 
devices that have evolved to include hard drives.
Nearly every digital copier contains a drive storing an image of each document 
copied, scanned, or e-mailed by the machine. When CBS News reporters visited a 
company that specialized in reselling used copiers, they found businesses and agencies 
had discarded machines containing lists of wanted sex offenders, drug raid targets, pay 
stubs with Social Security numbers, and check images. One copier’s hard drive even 
contained 300 pages of individual medical records, including a cancer diagnosis, which is 
a potential breach of federal privacy law (Keteyian 2010).
MISMatChING CONtrOLS tO threatS
Businesses sometimes devote considerable time and resources to implement 
security controls that are completely irrelevant to the threats the companies are 
trying to mitigate. these mismatches reveal a lack of understanding of the security 
technology and the threat. the controls may further add to the risk by providing 
a false sense of security. in reality, deploying the wrong control is like carrying a 
lightning rod to protect oneself from getting wet in a storm.
typical mismatches include:
Using firewalls to prevent data theft from applications that •	
are allowed to operate through the firewall
Using standard antivirus tools that are effective only against •	
previously identified threats, to protect against zero-day 
attacks
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Using controls at the operating-system level to detect •	
application-layer attacks
this mismatch does not mean that these controls are worthless. it simply means 
that if our goal is to deal with a specific threat, we must understand both the attacks 
and the controls well enough to identify which controls are applicable, and where it 
is necessary to add other controls. for example, if a firewall cannot prevent attacks 
against an application, we might deploy an additional control behind the firewall.
How Decision Makers Misperceive Risk
A manager makes decisions based on information from technical specialists and other 
experts. Therefore, the decisions managers make are only as good as the information they 
receive. Decision makers can misperceive risk when their decisions are based on biased 
or incomplete information.
Bias can influence these decisions every day. If people are trying to sell a particular 
proposal or point of view to their manager, what are they likely to do? They tend to select 
data supporting their arguments and often ignore data contradicting those arguments.
The danger of misperception is particularly acute when decision makers rely 
on a narrow range of sources who all share similar viewpoints. Without obtaining 
a diversity of viewpoints, managers don’t get a full picture of the risk. Like-minded 
individuals tend to agree with each other, as you might expect. When a group is 
composed solely of people with similar backgrounds and viewpoints, it may be 
particularly prone to group polarization (Breakwell 2007, 99) and the group’s decision 
may be more extreme than the mean of their individual views. This problem may be 
especially acute when the people involved share the same mental model of the world, 
as is likely to be the case when the group consists only of specialists from the same 
organization.
An even broader concern is how a focus on business goals can drive people to make 
unethical decisions. When these decisions are made by managers at the organizational 
level rather than at the individual level, the impact is compounded by the potential for 
widespread disaster.
After the Challenger space shuttle exploded in 1986, extensive post-crash analysis 
revealed the tragedy was caused because an O-ring on one of the shuttle’s booster 
rockets failed to seal due to the low ambient temperature at launch time.
However, it subsequently emerged that engineers had warned of the potential danger 
before the launch. Engineers from NASA contractor Morton Thiokol recommended the 
shuttle not be launched at low temperatures after analyzing data that indicated a link 
between low temperatures and O-ring problems. After NASA responded negatively to 
the engineers’ recommendation, Morton Thiokol’s general manager reportedly decided 
to treat the question of whether to launch was a “management decision.” Against the 
objections of their own engineers, Morton Thiokol’s managers then recommended NASA 
go ahead and launch, and NASA quickly accepted this recommendation (Bazerman and 
Tenbrunsel 2011, 13–16).
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For Morton Thiokol’s managers, the desire to meet the business goal of pleasing the 
company’s customer, NASA, apparently caused the ethical dimensions of the problem to 
fade from consideration—with terrible consequences.
According to Tenbrunsel, this “ethical fading” is not uncommon. The way a decision 
is framed can limit our perspective. If the decision is framed purely in terms of meeting 
business goals, ethical considerations may fade from view. In fact, we may become  
blind to the fact that we are confronting an ethical problem at all (Joffe-Walt and  
Spiegel 2012).
Another infamous ethical lapse involved the Ford Pinto, whose gas tank exploded 
in a number of rear-end collisions, resulting in fatalities. As Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 
describe (2011, 69–71), Ford discovered the dangers in preproduction testing. 
However, facing intense business competition, the company decided to go ahead 
with manufacturing anyway. The decision was based on a cost-benefit analysis. Ford 
apparently considered the choice as a business decision rather than an ethical decision 
and determined it would be cheaper to pay off lawsuits than make the repair. The impact 
of dehumanizing this risk decision was disastrous.
In the past, many information technology risk decisions have often been considered 
only in terms of their potential business impact. As information technology is integrated 
into more and more products, decisions about information risk will increasingly affect 
the lives of millions of people, making it essential to consider the ethical as well as the 
business dimensions of information risks. It becomes even more important that we, 
as CISOs, keep ethical considerations to the forefront. What is the potential impact 
of a security breach when a car’s sensors and control systems can be accessed via the 
Internet? Or when medical life-support equipment can be remotely controlled using 
wireless links?
How to Mitigate the Misperception of Risk
It should be apparent by now that the tendency to misperceive risk is universal. We need 
to find ways to help compensate for this misperception, given that it is our job to manage 
risk. As security professionals and managers, how can we mitigate the misperception  
of risk?
We can start by ensuring we include a diversity of viewpoints when making risk 
management decisions. Whenever possible, we should involve a broad cross-section of 
individuals representing groups across the organization. This diversity helps compensate 
for individual biases.
However, assembling the right mix of people is only the first step in building a more 
complete picture of risk. As information security professionals, we need to ensure that 
the discussion brings up new perspectives and views. We must ask penetrating questions 
designed to bring alternative viewpoints to the surface. We need to continually seek out 
the minority report, the view that is contrary to perceived wisdom. If the majority is telling 
me to turn right, are we missing something important that we’d find out by turning left?
This questioning counteracts the inevitable bias due to target fixation. We can also 
help counter target fixation by simply recognizing it exists, and then consciously trying to 
see the problem from someone else’s viewpoint.
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Uncovering New Perspectives During Risk Assessments
Risk assessment models can be valuable tools for helping to evaluate risks and to 
prioritize security resources. But all models have limitations. If we base our decisions 
solely on the results generated by a model, we may miss important risks.
At Intel, we typically use a risk assessment model based on a standard methodology. 
The model scores each risk using the formula:
Impact of Asset Loss × Probability of Threat × Vulnerability Exposure = 
Total Risk Points
For each risk, we assign a rating to each of the three contributing factors in the 
formula. To illustrate, I’ll use a scale of 1 to 5. A high-value asset, such as a microprocessor 
design, might warrant a rating of 5.
We then multiply the three ratings to obtain the total risk points. In this example, the 
maximum possible risk score is therefore 53, or 125.
A simple approach to risk management, using the output of the model, would be to 
divide the security budget among the highest-scoring risks.
The model is valuable because it provides a consistent method for helping compare 
and prioritize a broad spectrum of risks. However, allocating resources based only on 
the overall risk score can miss potentially disastrous “black swan” events that have very 
low probability but extremely high impact (Taleb 2007). Because the formula simply 
multiplies three ratings to obtain the overall score, black swans tend not to score as highly 
as lower-impact events with higher probability.
To counteract this problem, we can examine the information in the model in more 
detail, from different perspectives. We can create a list of the 20 most valuable assets and 
consider whether they need additional controls. In the same way, we can examine the top 
threats and vulnerability areas.
The point is that any model used to calculate risk should be used as a framework to 
drive a dialogue about all the variables and options, rather than as a tool that generates 
the answers to our problems. By discussing the issues from a variety of perspectives, we 
may identify important concerns we’d miss if we simply look at the overall risk scores.
Before I moved into the information security field, I worked in finance. In our 
finance group, we found the same principle held true when conducting ROI (return on 
investment) analysis. Our ROI model generated forecasts. However, it was by discussing 
the model’s assumptions that we determined whether or not the model’s predicted 
financial returns were reasonable.
Another method for prioritizing information systems risk management is to examine 
systems from the perspective of critical business processes and to consider the impact of a 
loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
An application that prints shipping labels may initially appear to be low priority 
because it is small, inexpensive, and doesn’t contain confidential data—it simply takes 
the information it needs from a customer information system on the network. However, 
if it’s unavailable because the network is experiencing problems, the impact is huge 
because the company cannot ship products.
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The potential impact to a business process of losing confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability may also vary depending on the stage of the business cycle. Consider a payroll 
system. Information confidentiality and integrity are always important; but availability is 
exceptionally critical on payday.
Communication Is Essential
Communication is an essential part of any strategy to mitigate the misperception of risk. 
To alter the way people behave, we need to change their perception of risk. To effect that 
change, we must communicate with them.
Changing perceptions is difficult. We may need to address long-held preconceptions 
about what is risky and what is not. Once people form an initial estimate of risk, they can 
be remarkably resistant to adjusting their perception, even when given new information 
(Breakwell 2007, 59).
In addition, each person may have a different perception of risk. To communicate 
effectively, we may need to understand an individual’s viewpoint and then tailor our 
communication accordingly. Consider the example of taking laptops to countries with 
a high risk of information theft (see sidebar). People who are extremely concerned may 
need a patient, thorough explanation of the risks and benefits of taking their laptop versus 
leaving it in the office. A less fearful individual may just need a quick reassurance and a 
few basic facts.
Though changing risk perceptions can be challenging, we don’t have any choice but 
to try. Employees will use social media whether we like it or not. When they do, they may 
not only put themselves at risk; they could be putting the company at risk too, if they are 
not careful.
Communication can reduce the issue of misperception due to asymmetry of 
information. This asymmetry is created when security professionals know about risks but 
don’t share the information with end users within their organization. When two parties 
differ in their knowledge of a threat or vulnerability, their perception of risk is likely to 
differ also. In other words, it is difficult for users to care about a hazard if they don’t even 
know it exists.
To succeed in changing users’ perceptions, we must communicate in ways that 
engage them, using language they understand rather than technical jargon. At Intel, 
we have employed entertaining, interactive video tools to help engage users and teach 
them how to spot dangers such as phishing web sites. As I’ll explain further in Chapter 5, 
we’ve found these methods have been highly effective in changing users’ awareness and 
perceptions, and ultimately in shaping their behavior.
Patiently explaining to users the consequences of their actions can also help shape 
their perception of risk. In some countries, pirating software is so commonplace that it 
is almost an accepted part of the culture. This poses a problem for many multinational 
companies. Employees in these countries may not even believe copying software 
is wrong, let alone view it as an illegal act. It can be useful to describe the potential 
consequences of copyright infringement for the individual and for the organization. We 
can explain to employees that a decision to pirate software can expose the company to 
software license compliance risks. The consequences may be even more far-reaching if 
the copied software is then incorporated into the company’s technology-based products 
or services. If a product is discovered to include stolen software, the company may be 
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unable to ship it to customers, which means a significant loss of revenue. Of course, 
employees may experience personal consequences too: if they copy software, they run a 
high risk of losing their jobs.
Organizations as a whole may also be blind to risks, or simply choose to ignore 
them. One way to overcome this misperception is to patiently build up a list of examples 
showing how other organizations ignored similar risks and experienced adverse 
consequences as a result, according to Breakwell, the University of Bath psychologist  
(pers. comm. 2012). The more examples in the list, the harder they are to ignore.
“Organizations stick their heads in the sand, ostrich-like,” she says. “But if you have 
a database of examples illustrating where things have gone wrong elsewhere, it becomes 
harder and harder to find enough sand to stick your head in.”
ChaLLeNGING preCONCeptIONS: taKING LaptOpS  
tO hIGh-rISK COUNtrIeS
it may be necessary to challenge perceived wisdom in order to expose a clear 
picture of the real risks, and consequently make the right decision.
some companies react to the higher rates of intellectual property theft in certain 
countries by barring employees from taking their corporate laptops on business 
trips to those countries. in some cases, the companies issue employees with a new 
“clean” system from which all corporate data has been purged.
the goal is to prevent situations in which information theft might occur, such as 
when an employee leaves a laptop containing corporate data unattended in a hotel 
room. a malicious individual could then get physical access to the system and copy 
the data or implant software that will surreptitiously steal information over time.
But does preventing employees from taking their familiar laptops really solve the 
problem? Let’s suppose we issue employees with a new, data-free laptop. to do 
their jobs, they’ll still need to use this system to log into their corporate e-mail and 
other applications—providing an opportunity for hackers to intercept the network 
traffic.
furthermore, if attackers really want to target an individual, they have ways to do it 
without gaining physical access to the system. With a spearphishing attack, they can 
induce the individual to click on a malicious link that remotely downloads malware.
preventing employees from taking their laptops and information also deprives the 
organization of the key business benefits of using a full-featured portable computing 
device; employees will likely be less productive as a result. so when assessing the 
risks of traveling with mobile devices, an organization needs to think through the 
tradeoff between risk and benefit, including the cost of providing what they believe 
to be a “clean” system and the impact on the user.
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Building Credibility
Ultimately, our ability to influence people’s risk perception depends on our credibility. 
We need to build trusted relationships with executives and specialists across the 
organization to ensure our security concerns are seriously considered rather than seen as 
fearmongering or target fixation.
Trust is hard to create and easy to destroy. If business groups think we are providing 
unreliable and exaggerated information, will they trust us to provide their security? If we 
create a security scare about a threat that turns out to be irrelevant or overblown, we may 
be seen as just another source of misperception.
As I’ll describe in more detail in Chapter 9, we can establish credibility by 
demonstrating consistency, striving for objectivity, and showing that we can accurately 
predict the real security issues affecting the organization, and then communicate them in 
an effective and timely way. Credibility is also built on the competence that comes from 
understanding the business and technology as well as possessing core security skills. 
As the scope and importance of information security continue to expand, creating this 
credibility provides an opportunity to step into a more valuable, high-profile role within 
the organization.
